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Abstract
Increasing evidence from the empirical economic and psychological literature suggests that
positive and negative well-being are more than opposite ends of the same phenomenon. Two
separate measures of the dependent variable may be needed when analyzing the determinants
of subjective well-being. We argue that this conclusion reflects in part the use of too restric-
tive econometric models. A flexible multiple-index ordered probit panel data model with varying
thresholds can identify response asymmetries in single-item measures of subjective well-being. An
application to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-2004 shows that income has
only a minor effect on positive subjective well-being but a large effect on negative well-being.
JEL Classification: I31, D12, C23
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1 Introduction
For economists, the relationship between material well-being and overall quality of life is a matter of
great concern. Due to the lack of good life-quality measurements the two are often equated, leading
to prescriptions of policies and institutions that focus on income only. Fortunately, much progress
has been made in recent years in measuring quality of life, based on the principle that individuals are
the best judges of their own well-being, and that their judgment can be elicited using survey-based
indicators of subjective well-being (SWB). This approach uses individual responses to a question
such as “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?” with categorical answers
ranging from “completely dissatisfied” to “completely satisfied”. Self-reported life-satisfaction has
been shown to be a reliable, valid, and consistent measure of individual well-being (see Diener and
Lucas 2000, and the references therein).
Using this widely available new instrument, the relationship between material well-being and
quality of life can be and has been subject to rigorous empirical analysis. There is by now a large
literature on the relationship between income and SWB, with data for different countries, different
points in time, and using different model specifications. Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), and
Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002) offer comprehensive reviews. An important early result, sometimes
referred to as “well-being paradox” (Easterlin 1974, 1995), is that the average satisfaction in a
country does not increase as countries grow wealthier. At the individual level, there is a weak
positive cross-sectional association between income and SWB. If one follows an individual over the
life-cycle however, as income first increases and then levels off, happiness remains unchanged.
Empirical explanations for the paradox have ventured in two directions. One literature focuses on
the moderating role of income expectations, aspirations, as well as adaptation. Another literature –
the one our paper contributes to – conjectures that a single-item SWB measure may be too restrictive
to fully capture the impact of income on quality of life. In this view, there is a crucial distinction
between positive and negative well-being, borrowing from psychology, where positive well-being is
related to good feelings such as happiness, self-esteem, or life-satisfaction, whereas negative well-being
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is related to bad emotions such as depression, anxiety, or distress.
Psychologists claim a certain degree of independence between these two, since important deter-
minants of positive well-being are found to have less influence on negative well-being, and vice versa
(Huppert and Whittington 2003). The empirical strategy to identify such asymmetries is to find one
measure of positive and one measure of negative well-being (e.g., life-satisfaction versus psychological
stress) and to perform two separate analyses with equal regressors. In a recent paper, Headey and
Wooden (2004) translate this concept to economic circumstances and show, among other things,
that income and employment status have stronger effects on financial satisfaction than they have on
financial stress.
We argue in this paper that the distinction between positive and negative well-being can and
should be made even if one uses only a single-item measure of well-being. Roughly speaking, move-
ments in the left part of the outcome distribution represent more or less dissatisfaction (or un-
happiness), whereas movements in the right part of the outcome distribution represent more or less
satisfaction (or happiness). The model we propose allows income to affect satisfaction and dissatisfac-
tion in different ways, relative to the benchmark models used in the previous literature. Specifically,
we develop a panel data version of the Maddala/Terza varying threshold ordered response model
(Maddala 1983, Terza 1985). The model is based on multiple indices, possibly but not necessarily
varying by the level of SWB, and it allows for unobservable individual specific effects.
With data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we find that income significantly reduces
negative SWB but it does not affect positive SWB in a subsample of men living in one-person house-
holds. This finding corroborates previous evidence of asymmetric effects from multi-item analyses,
this time with a single-item measure. An immediate implication of response asymmetries is a variable
compensating income variation. For example, the implied income compensation for unemployment
differs by a factor of six compared to the standard models, depending on the position of the individual
on the SWB scale. For women, the evidence for the asymmetry hypothesis is less clear cut.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we offer a brief review of
the literature on income and SWB. One important lesson is that using a single measure of SWB
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together with a sufficiently flexible econometric model has clear advantages for the calculation of
compensating income variation, as it is increasingly applied in the valuation of public goods and
intangibles. The econometric models are presented in Section 3. The data and the estimation results
are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Empirical evidence on the relationship between income and subjective well-being (SWB) is important
for (at least) two reasons. First, the design and evaluation of economic policies often takes income as
the target quantity of interest. The idea is, of course, that income is a good proxy for well-being, and
that it is easy to measure. If the link between income and well-being is less strong than suspected,
then economic policies based on income (or GDP) maximization alone may turn out to be inferior
from an overall well-being perspective.
Second, the relationship between income and well-being may be used to put a monetary value –
or shadow price – on non-traded goods, usually in the context of cost-benefit analyses. The basic
idea is one of compensation: in case of a “bad”, how much of an increase in income is required to
offset the negative effect of the bad, while keeping the person at the same level of SWB as in the
absence of the bad? Similarly, in case of a good, one can implicitly determine the shadow price
of the good by asking how much income a person would be willing to give up in order to obtain
the good. Examples for this line of research are Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), who estimate
the pecuniary value of a lasting marriage (relative to widowhood) to be $100,000 per year. Other
examples include Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who estimate the money-equivalent value of
the psychological cost of unemployment, and Schwarze (2003) who uses the principle to determine
an income equivalence scale, i.e., the income compensation required to keep the same level of an
individual’s well-being with one additional household member present. Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer
(2004) estimate the value of public safety, or the absence of terrorism. Van Praag and Baarsma
(2005) measure the external cost of air traffic noise for people living near the Amsterdam Airport.
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Unfortunately, the implied compensation may be sensitive to the chosen model, and too restrictive
assumptions may lead to spurious estimates. Usually, income is entered in logarithmic form, either
in a linear regression framework or in a conditional probability model such as the ordered probit
model. In this case, the marginal effects are inversely proportional to income: to achieve the same
increase in (average) happiness, larger and larger absolute changes in income are necessary. While
semi-parametric estimators usually provide some support for a log-linear functional form, they still
preclude the occurrence of asymmetric effects as defined in the previous section.
Only recently have systematic attempts been made to allow for more flexible response patterns
by using generalized models. The heart of the matter is the single index structure of the prevailing
models. In single-index models the dependent variable, say y, is modeled as a function of a linear
combination of independent variables, say x. For example, the linear regression model is a single-
index model with E(y|x) = x′β with parameter vector β. Other examples include the probit model
or the ordered probit model. Contrary to that, in multiple-index models, such as the multinomial
logit model, the relationship between y and x depends on more than one linear combination of x,
i.e., on x′β1, x′β2, etc. The key to more flexible models of the income/well-being relationship lies in
the formulation of multiple-index models that respect the ordered nature of the dependent variable.
A recent example for such an approach is the latent class analysis presented in Clark et al. (2005).
They identify four distinct classes (and hence four separate index functions), using data from the
European Community Household Survey. In their application, the marginal probability effects of an
income change are larger in the “latent happy” than in the “latent unhappy” classes.
We propose in this paper an alternative approach with outcome-specific parameters. The techni-
cal details are discussed in the next section. The important point to notice is the close relationship
between our approach and the psychological distinction between positive and negative well-being
(e.g., Diener 1984, Diener and Emmons 1984, Headey et al. 1993, Diener et al. 1999). While this
literature models asymmetries in the well-being response by using two separate measures of the left
hand side variable, one of well-being (e.g., life-satisfaction or financial satisfaction) and the other of
ill-being (e.g., mental health or financial stress), we allow for such asymmetric effects in a single-item
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well-being measure.
The potential benefit of the suggested approach is that compensating variations can be calculated
without taking into account a complex correlation structure between positive and negative measures
of well-being. Moreover, we do not rely on the availability of such measures, instead we can directly
access large databases containing only one measure of well-being, such as life-satisfaction. Our
approach is closely related to the flexible estimation of marginal probability effects, i.e., what we
are looking at is how much the probability of each outcome in the SWB distribution responds to
a marginal increase in income. Compared to the previous literature, we propose a new panel data
model that is very flexible in the way income affects SWB and additionally allows for individual
specific effects.
3 Econometric Modeling
Most empirical work on the determinants of SWB so far uses either linear regression or single-index
ordered response models. While the latter account for the discreteness and ordering of the dependent
variable, they impose an implicit cardinalization such that, for example, the trade-off ratios between
income and other determinants of well-being must be constant across the distribution of outcomes
(Winkelmann and Boes 2006). Since we want to estimate unrestricted income effects for low and
high levels of well-being, we need to use a more flexible model, and we propose a generalization of
Maddala’s (1983) and Terza’s (1985) model to panel data.
Let yit ∈ {1, . . . , J} denote SWB of individual i = 1, . . . , n at time t = 1, . . . , Ti obtained from
the survey response to the general satisfaction question, and let xit denote a vector of (possibly time-
varying) covariates. The relationship between yit and xit can be specified in terms of cumulative
conditional probabilities:
P (yit ≤ j|xit; θj) = Φ(−xitθj) j = 1, . . . , J − 1 (1)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, and θj
denotes a vector of category-specific parameters including a constant term. In order to ensure
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positive cell probabilities, we require the θj ’s to fulfill the strict inequalities xitθ1 > . . . > xitθJ−1.
Rewriting xitθj as
xitθj = αj + x˜itβj j = 1, . . . , J − 1 (2)
we see that the standard ordered probit model is nested for β1 = . . . = βJ−1, i.e., under the hypoth-
esis of equal slope parameters. The cumulative probabilities in (1) form a well-defined conditional
probability model which can be estimated by standard maximum likelihood methods to obtain con-
sistent and asymptotically normal estimates of θ. In order to provide valid inference, the standard
errors should be adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
In order to exploit the advantages of panel data more fully, the model can be augmented by
individual specific time invariant effects. Conditioning on such effects avoids bias if, for example,
unobserved personality traits affect SWB as well as observable characteristics (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters 2004). Let cij denote individual effects that are constant over time but possible vary by
the SWB level, and rewrite (1) conditional on cij
P (yit ≤ j|xit, cij ; θj) = Φ(−xitθj − cij) j = 1, . . . , J − 1 (3)
or in terms of a conditional probability model
P (yit = 1|xit, ci; θ) = Φ(−xitθ1 − ci1)
P (yit = j|xit, ci; θ) = Φ(−xitθj − cij)− Φ(−xitθj−1 − cij−1) j = 2, . . . , J − 1 (4)
P (yit = J |xit, ci; θ) = 1− Φ(−xitθJ−1 − ciJ−1)
where θ = (θ′1 . . . θ′J−1)
′ and ci = (ci1 . . . ciJ−1)′. We assume that xit is strictly exogenous
conditional on ci and that outcomes are independent conditional on (xi, ci), where xi contains xit for
all t. The first assumption rules out lagged dependent variables in xit, the second assumption allows
for dependencies in yit across t if conditioned only on observables xi.
Without specifying the relationship between xit and ci, i.e., treating ci as fixed parameters to be
estimated along with θ, model (4) introduces an incidental parameters problem. For fixed time and
large cross-sectional dimension, the number of parameters ci is unbounded, with available information
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on ci being fixed, which yields inconsistent estimators of ci and θ. We solve this problem by treating
ci as random variable drawn along with (xi, yi) and following the idea of Chamberlain (1980) under
a Mundlak (1978) restriction to allow for possible correlation between ci and xi:
cij = x¯iγj + αi (5)
where x¯i is the average of xit over time, γj is a conformable parameter vector, and αi is an orthogonal
error with αi|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2α). The joint distribution of (yi1, . . . , yiTi) conditional on observables
is then obtained by integrating out αi in the probabilities (4),
f(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi; θ, γ, σα) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Ti∏
t=1
J∏
j=1
P (yit = j|xit, x¯i, αi; θ, γ)1(yit=j) 1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi (6)
with γ = (γ′1 . . . γ′J−1)
′ and indicator function 1(·). The integral in (6) does not have a closed
form solution, but with a simple change of variables from αi to ψi = αi/(
√
2σα) it can be rewrit-
ten in a form amenable to Gauss-Hermite quadrature for numerical approximation. Estimation of
parameters by maximum likelihood is straightforward once the integral has been evaluated, and the
resulting estimator is consistent, efficient and approximately normally distributed with covariance
matrix equal to the inverse of the expected Hessian. Model (3) with random effects specification
has been implemented in a new Stata module called regoprob available on the author’s homepage
www.unizh.ch/sts/ or via the ssc commands in Stata.
4 Data
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel survey of randomly selected house-
holds in Germany (see Burkhauser et al. 2001). Personal information is available for all household
members aged 16 and above. Our data are drawn from the West Germans (A) subsample 1984-2004,
yielding a maximum of 21 observations per individual. We apply a number of standard selection
criteria: included individuals are between 25 and 65 years old at the time of the survey, and we
require non-missing information on all the included variables.
In addition, we employ a novel restriction by considering single person households only. The
rationale for this selection is that the match between reported household income and individual
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material well-being is much better in single-person households than we could possibly hope for in a
multi-person household. General household surveys such as the GSOEP typically include two types
of income measures, one being total household income (from all sources), the other being personal
labor earnings. Clearly, personal labor earnings are not a very good indicator of material well-being,
in particular, but not only for persons who do not work, as it does not include any government
transfers (e.g., child benefit, government grants, or rent subsidies). Household income (net of taxes
and social security contributions) is in general a more appropriate measure. However, in multi-person
households, there remain two types of ambiguities. First, there is an ongoing debate on the right
equivalence scale in order to reflect economies of scale in household production and consumption.
Secondly, we do not know whether resources are shared evenly within the household, but such an
(arbitrary) assumption is required when assigning one income to several household members.
For these reasons, we find it instructive to study the relationship between income and SWB in the
context of single person households. Of course, this raises the question of external validity: to what
extent can results for single person households be extrapolated to the population of all households?
While single person households are clearly selected on a number of factors (such as age, and possibly
also income) it is a-priori unclear why the relationship between income and SWB should be different
for such persons.
All in all, this approach leaves us with 5007 person-year observations for men, and with 4727
person-year observations for women. The dependent variable is, as mentioned before, the response
to the survey question “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”. There are
relatively few responses in the 0-2 range. For this reason, and to preserve some degrees of freedom (a
full set of regression parameters is added for each additional category), we use a modified 0-9 scale,
where the original 0-2 responses have been grouped into the lowest “dissatisfied” category.
Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution of SWB responses in our sample, separately for men
and women. People are mostly satisfied with their life: about two thirds report a SWB level of seven
or higher, and women have a slightly higher average SWB level than men. The distribution in Figure
1 is characteristic of most SWB distributions in the sense that the majority of people responds a
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relatively high level of SWB, although the highest response category is chosen relatively infrequently.
— Insert Figure 1 about here —
In the regression analysis, control variables include - apart from income - a second order polyno-
mial in age and dummy variables for unemployment and health status. The health dummy indicates
good health status and has been generated using the satisfaction with health response. Satisfaction
with health is originally measured on the eleven-point scale (0-10) and we dichotomized at the me-
dian value of seven. Of course, household status and gender is controlled for as well by the way
the sample is set up. We use a relatively simple specification with only a few variables. This has
two main advantages. First, since eight regression parameters are estimated for each variable, fewer
regressors keep the model manageable. Second, many of additional variables used in the previous
literature are arguably endogenous choice variables, obstructing the interpretation of the results.
Table 1 summarizes the sample means of the explanatory variables by gender. Among one-person
households, men have a significantly higher monthly income than women (about 260 Euros) and are
on average more than five years younger. The unemployment rate is about 2.5 percentage points
higher for men than for women, and 58.2 percent of the women are relatively satisfied with their
health status (compared to 65.6 percent of the men). These variations can largely be explained by
the different age distributions of single male and single female households. Men are mostly living
alone when they are young and at the beginning of their career path. Women are more likely to live
alone when they are older, contributing factors being a higher incidence of widowhood due to greater
life-expectancy.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
Table 2 cross-tabulates the sample means of the dependent variable conditional on the SWB
response, again separately for men and women. The income variable shows a lot of variation along
the SWB dimension. For men (panel A), the lowest average monthly income (1124 Euro) is observed
for individuals with very low SWB, the highest income (1519 Euro) for those with response “8”.
When moving from the utmost left part of the SWB distribution to the right, average income is first
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increasing then decreasing. A similar pattern can be observed for women (panel B), although on a
lower level. Concerning the rest of the variables, a common result known from the previous literature
and also confirmed by the present data is that among less satisfied people the unemployment rate is
relatively high, and that reported health status and SWB are positively correlated.
— Insert Table 2 about here —
5 Estimation Results
In this section, we report on the estimation results of the relationship between income and subjective
well-being. We first present the estimated income parameters under several model assumptions, then
turn our attention to the implications with respect to the asymmetry hypothesis, and finally discuss
the robustness of our results.
Two different models of subjective well-being have been estimated. The first is a standard ordered
probit model (OProbit). The second is the generalized ordered probit model (GOProbit), where all
parameters are outcome-specific. In order to check for model robustness, we also report the results of
a series of eight random effects binary probit models (DProbit), where the dependent variables result
from dichotomization of the SWB response, i.e., yit > 2 against yit ≤ 2, yit > 3 against yit ≤ 3, and
so on. The binary regressions consistently estimate the parameters θ in the cumulative probabilities
(3) without imposing the ordering. By contrast, the generalized ordered probit model takes into
account the ordering and is therefore more efficient.
Table 3 displays the estimated income coefficients separately for men (panel A) and women (panel
B). For men, we find a positive and significant parameter in the standard model (0.362 with z-value
6.67) indicating a positive relationship between income and SWB. In the generalized model, eight
different parameters are estimated. The income coefficients are slightly higher for the parameter
vectors θ1 to θ6 than the overall estimate in the standard model. The point estimate decreases but
is still significant for θ7, and finally turns negative and insignificant for θ8. When comparing the
generalized ordered and the binary models we notice very similar results.
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— Insert Table 3 about here —
The estimated coefficients in the sample of women are smaller (in absolute value) and less signifi-
cant than those for men indicating a weaker relationship between income and SWB. For example, in
the standard model we obtain a point estimate of 0.131, which is only about a third of that for men,
and the z-value decreases to 1.97. Interestingly, in the generalized model the income coefficients are
significant on the 5%-level only for θ4 and θ5, while all other income coefficients are insignificant. As
for men, the results from the binary regressions support the generalized model. If we formally test
the generalized ordered probit model against the standard model, we can reject the null hypothe-
sis of equal slope parameters for men (LR203 = 548.9) and for women (LR203 = 430.1). The null
hypothesis of equal income coefficients is also rejected in both cases.
There are a number of ways to interpret the estimated parameters, but we focus here on two
concepts that offer a very intuitive interpretation when dealing with conditional probability models.
The first is the marginal probability effect (MPE) of income and the second the trade-off ratio
between income and unemployment. The former shows how marginal changes in income affect the
distribution of SWB responses, which is of particular interest for the asymmetry hypothesis since we
are able to identify whether the effect of income on SWB differs for low and high SWB. The latter
concept provides an extension to the discussion of asymmetric effects by answering the question of
how much income is necessary to compensate for unemployment, given the levels of SWB. It differs
from the first, as it implicitly also responds to asymmetric effects of unemployment throughout the
distribution of outcomes.
MPE’s can be obtained by taking first derivatives of (4) with respect to the variable(s) of interest.
However, since the cij ’s are random variables, we cannot directly calculate the MPE’s without further
assumptions. One possibility would be to set ci equal to its expected value and proceed with standard
calculus. Alternatively, due to the normality assumptions, the cumulative probabilities marginal on
ci are given by (1), where θ needs to be replaced by ϑ = θ(1+σ2c )
−1/2. This is called the population-
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averaged coefficient vector. It follows that
MPE
(l)
1 =
∂P (yit = 1|xit;ϑ)
∂x
(l)
it
= −φ(−xitϑ1)ϑ(l)1
MPE
(l)
j =
∂P (yit = j|xit;ϑ)
∂x
(l)
it
= φ(−xitϑj−1)ϑ(l)j−1 − φ(−xitϑj)ϑ(l)j j = 2, . . . J − 1 (7)
MPE
(l)
J =
∂P (yit = J |xit;ϑ)
∂x
(l)
it
= φ(−xitϑJ−1)ϑ(l)J−1
where x(l)it denotes the l-th element in xit (here assumed to be income) and ϑ
(l)
j the corresponding
scaled (income) coefficient. Discrete probability changes can be approximated by ∆P (yit = j|xit;ϑ) ≈
MPE
(l)
j ∆x
(l)
it . Obviously, the MPE’s are functions of xit and therefore differ for each individual. We
evaluate the MPE’s at the sample averages of the regressors.
Table 4 summarizes the marginal probability effects of income by gender. Consider, for example,
the results for men and take the ceteris paribus effect of increasing logarithmic household income by
a small amount on the probability of responding a SWB level of “8”. Table 4 shows a value of 0.059
for the standard model. This means that the probability of a response of “8” increases by 0.059
percentage points if we increase logarithmic income by 0.01, which corresponds approximately to a
one-percent increase in level income. A doubling of income, i.e., a change in logarithmic income by
0.693, increases the probability of response “8” by about 0.059×0.693×100, or about 4.09 percentage
points, ceteris paribus.
— Insert Table 4 about here —
Comparing the MPE’s among the three different models and over all possible outcomes, we obtain
the following main results. For men all models suggest that more income significantly reduces the
probability of low SWB (0-5), and significantly increases the probability of response “8”. For high
SWB responses (9-10), the standard model predicts a strong positive relationship between income
and SWB, whereas the generalized model and also the binary models do not find a significant effect.
Since the restricted OProbit is clearly rejected, we conclude that income has no effect on positive
well-being. Our preferred specification supports the asymmetry hypothesis for men: higher income
decreases the probability of negative well-being (low SWB), but it does not affect the probability of
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positive well-being (high SWB).
For women the relationship between income and SWB is relatively weak. While the standard
model finds small but significant effects for low and high SWB responses, the generalized model
predicts a significant negative effect only on the probability of responses “5” and “6”. The gender
difference might be explained by social norms that assign the role of primary income earner to men
and therefore make income a relatively more important determinant of male well-being (see also
Lalive and Stutzer 2004).
An alternative interpretation of the coefficients assesses the importance of income relative to
other determinants. Take unemployment as an example: what is the income increase required to
offset the negative well-being effect of unemployment? While unemployment is a binary variable,
marginal changes in unemployment, or in this case more precisely, the sample unemployment rate,
are meaningful as long as we are interested in average MPE’s. It follows from totally differentiating
that
dP (yit = j|xit;ϑ) =MPE(l)j dx(l)it +MPE(m)j dx(m)it j = 1, . . . , J (8)
where x(l)it and x
(m)
it denote income and unemployment, respectively, and the MPE’s are given by
(7). The approximation in (8) directly leads to the concept of compensating variation: How much of
a variation in one regressor (here income) is needed to offset the given change in another regressor
(here unemployment) such that dP (yit = j|xit;ϑ) = 0 ∀j, i.e., all probabilities remain unchanged.
Rearranging terms yields
dx
(l)
it
dx
(m)
it
= −MPE
(m)
j
MPE
(l)
j
j = 1, . . . , J (9)
In the standard model, this trade-off ratio reduces to the ratio of coefficients which does not vary
across outcomes, whereas in the generalized model such an restriction is not imposed.
Table 5 shows the required changes in logarithmic income if the (sample) unemployment rate
increases by one percentage point, dx(m)it = 0.01, given the SWB distribution is fixed. If we want
to interpret the reported numbers, we need to be careful with respect to the significance of MPE’s.
The trade-off ratio does only make sense for significant income effects. In this case, the required
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change in income is either zero if the MPE of unemployment is statistically not different from zero,
or the change is positive (or negative) for significant unemployment effects. We marked the four
cases (non-sensible/zero/positive/negative) with ×/ ◦ /+ /−.
— Insert Table 5 about here —
The numbers in Table 5 (multiplied by 100) approximate the percentage change in income, e.g.,
for men in the standard model a 0.019 means that income must increase by 1.9 percent to offset
the increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage point. As expected, the trade-off ratios
in the ordered probit model are constant for all levels of SWB, and interpretation therefore is not
particularly interesting. In the generalized model, required income changes vary between 0.6 and
4.2 percent. An important observation is that income compensations are entirely ineffective for men
with high SWB, and effective for medium to low satisfied men, though in a very heterogeneous way.
For women, a compensation for unemployment in terms of income is rather unpromising, and other
factors determining SWB need to be identified when looking for effective compensation schemes.
While these results are obtained for a specific sample and a specific parametric model with
its set of assumptions, we found a remarkable robustness of the main conclusions with respect to
alternative specifications and samples. Possible alternatives include the use of different link functions
(rather than the probit ones), including the logit, the log-logistic, and the complementary log-log;
conditioning on fixed effects using Chamberlain’s (1982) conditional logit model; the use of multi-
person household samples; and possible endogeneity of income in the SWB equation. We could not
find evidence for endogeneity. Neither was the probit assumption rejected, nor did the response
asymmetry for men disappear in multi-person households.
6 Conclusion
This paper reconsiders the relationship between income and subjective well-being. Recent empirical
evidence suggests that income might have asymmetric effects on positive and negative well-being. In
this literature, the empirical strategy to identify such asymmetries is to use two separate measures
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of well-being, e.g., life-satisfaction and psychological stress. This approach has many disadvantages
compared to the usage of a single measure, e.g., the lack of availability of such multi-dimensional data,
or the problem of possibly complex correlation structures when one is interested in compensating
variations. We therefore propose a new and very flexible panel data model with which we can analyze
whether income effects depend on the level of well-being. The model allows for individual specific
effects and outcome-specific parameters, the latter feature being particularly important for income
to affect SWB in a non-monotonic way, i.e., the effects depend on the SWB level.
In a sample of men in single-person households drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
waves 1984 to 2004, we find strong support for the hypothesis of asymmetric income effects: while
income significantly reduces the probability of low SWB responses, it does not affect high SWB. For
women in single-person households income plays a minor role in the formation of SWB, and support
of the asymmetry hypothesis is rather weak. In an extension to cost-benefit considerations, we
calculate the trade-off ratio between income and unemployment and show that the required income
compensations vary between 0.6 and 4.2 percent. These are far from being constant – a restriction
that is imposed in the standard ordered probit model.
Thus, by investigating marginal probability effects and trade-off ratios we were able to document
an asymmetric impact of income on SWB using a single measure of well-being, namely general life-
satisfaction. If one wants to estimate marginal probability effects and compensating variations in a
meaningful way, then one should use the generalized ordered probit model rather than the simpler
models prevailing in earlier research.
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Figure 1: Marginal Distribution of Subjective Well-Being Responses
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Sex
Men Women
Variable Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
Monthly income in EUR 1403.5 12.0 1140.9 10.3
Age in years 40.24 0.16 45.80 0.20
Unemployment (0/1) 0.083 0.004 0.058 0.003
Good health (0/1) 0.656 0.007 0.582 0.007
Number of Obs. 5008 4727
Table 2: Sample Means by Sex and Well-Being Level
Subjective Well-Being
Variable 0 - 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A. Men
Relative Freq. 4.21% 3.63% 4.61% 12.98% 12.26% 24.44% 26.68% 7.53% 3.65%
Income 1123.9 1152.0 1414.3 1255.8 1324.0 1477.9 1519.3 1473.6 1267.8
Age 43.86 41.83 41.07 43.55 40.32 38.99 38.91 38.19 43.79
Unemployment 0.336 0.176 0.182 0.126 0.103 0.056 0.030 0.029 0.022
Good Health 0.336 0.319 0.338 0.340 0.549 0.732 0.841 0.897 0.896
B. Women
Relative Freq. 3.07% 3.24% 3.81% 14.45% 10.98% 19.93% 27.99% 9.99% 6.56%
Income 930.5 935.4 1047.4 978.1 1055.7 1196.7 1238.6 1290.7 1082.1
Age 47.50 45.75 45.59 49.28 46.25 43.37 44.62 45.34 49.84
Unemployment 0.234 0.124 0.172 0.089 0.052 0.036 0.039 0.013 0.035
Good Health 0.159 0.196 0.267 0.274 0.420 0.601 0.767 0.847 0.845
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Table 3: Estimated Income Coefficients by Sex and Well-Being Level
Parameter vector
overall θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8
A. Men
OProbit 0.362
(0.054)
GOProbit 0.417 0.470 0.423 0.372 0.429 0.456 0.314 -0.066
(0.141) (0.109) (0.093) (0.082) (0.079) (0.082) (0.115) (0.152)
DProbit 0.396 0.412 0.473 0.351 0.442 0.413 0.228 -0.102
(0.153) (0.118) (0.103) (0.086) (0.082) (0.082) (0.118) (0.183)
B. Women
OProbit 0.131
(0.067)
GOProbit 0.256 0.060 0.144 0.234 0.329 0.175 -0.070 -0.045
(0.225) (0.144) (0.131) (0.108) (0.100) (0.098) (0.117) (0.146)
DProbit 0.039 0.014 0.128 0.196 0.311 0.162 -0.066 0.012
(0.199) (0.157) (0.128) (0.107) (0.101) (0.097) (0.120) (0.169)
Notes: The models are the standard ordered probit (OProbit), the generalized ordered probit (GOProbit), and
a series of binary probit models (DProbit), where the dependent variables result from dichotomization of the
SWB response. The estimates are reported for logarithmic income. Each model controls for a quadratic form
in age, unemployment (0/1), good health (0/1), and time fixed effects. Individual effects are assumed to be
decomposable into a linear function of individual group means and orthogonal error, and the likelihood for each
individual is approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
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Table 4: Marginal Probability Effects of Income by Sex and Well-Being Level
Subjective Well-Being
0 - 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A. Men
OProbit -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.037 -0.020 0.003 0.059 0.027 0.014
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
GOProbit -0.020 -0.022 -0.014 -0.027 -0.037 -0.005 0.088 0.039 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.033) (0.109) (0.089)
DProbit -0.019 -0.017 -0.029 -0.018 -0.048 -0.011 0.094 0.028 -0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.011) (0.006)
B. Women
OProbit -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 -0.008 -0.003 0.020 0.012 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006)
GOProbit -0.009 0.005 -0.011 -0.036 -0.040 0.038 0.064 -0.008 -0.003
(0.008) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.029) (0.116) (0.125) (0.027)
DProbit -0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.031 -0.040 0.034 0.059 -0.011 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.012)
Notes: The models are the standard ordered probit (OProbit), the generalized ordered probit (GOProbit), and a
series of binary probit models (DProbit). The marginal probability effects have been calculated for logarithmic
income evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables and marginal on the individual effect. For
the binary models, we approximated the cross-parameter covariances by the method proposed by White (1982).
An increase in income by one percent corresponds to an increase in logarithmic income by 0.01, i.e., reported
numbers can be interpreted directly as change in percentage points. Standard errors are approximated using
the delta method.
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Table 5: Trade-Off Ratios Between Income and Unemployment
Subjective Well-Being
0 - 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A. Men
OProbit 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.019× 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.019+
GOProbit 0.009+ 0.006+ 0.042+ 0.015+ 0.010+ 0.028× 0.011+ 0.011× -0.179×
B. Women
OProbit 0.026× 0.026+ 0.026+ 0.026+ 0.026× 0.026× 0.026× 0.026× 0.026×
GOProbit 0.035× -0.029× 0.029× 0.007+ -0.004◦ 0.024× -0.008× -0.094× 0.102×
Notes: The models are the standard ordered probit (OProbit) and the generalized ordered probit (GOProbit).
The trade-off ratios show the required change in logarithmic income to compensate for an increase in the (sample)
unemployment rate by one percentage point, given the probability of a certain SWB response remains unchanged.
The ratio of significant marginal income and unemployment effects is marked +/− (positive/negative). If
the marginal income effect is insignificant, the ratio is marked ×. If the income effect is significant but the
unemployment effect is not, the ratio is marked ◦.
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